Indonesia towards 2030 and beyond: A Long-Run International Trade Foresight

  • by Kiki Verico Abstract: One of the most important variables in emerging economies like Indonesia is the stability of the exchange rate. Unstable exchange rates make it almost impossible for business ventures to plan their businesses. The higher the depreciation of the Rupiah, the higher the inflation rate, and this will decrease people’s purchasing power. In the balance of payments, the stability of the exchange rate and capital account are strongly influenced by the current account balance. A study found that in Indonesia, in the long run (Johansen Procedure) Indonesia’s current account balance affects its real exchange rate, while in the short run (VECM) it affects the nominal exchange rate. The study also found that in the current account balance, the factor affecting the exchange rate is the trade balance. Indonesia’s trade balance relies on a surplus of trade in goods, especially agricultural products, petroleum and gas. The price of products in the primary sector is very vulnerable because of the volatility of primary products as a result of the world’s oil and gas price. Indonesia’s current account balance is highly dependent on manufacturing products’ trade. Another study found that in practice, manufacturing trade influences capital flows, rather than vice versa. Therefore, in order to maintain a positive long-term economic growth and stable exchange rate, Indonesia must increase its trade competitiveness, especially in the manufacturing sector. This paper will explore the challenges and opportunities of international trade in Indonesia towards 2030 and afterwards.…
    07 Jul
    07 Jul
  • Abstract: Using extensive data on 1970 and 1987 urban characteristics, the paper analyzes changes in employment in specific manufacturing industries in cities between 1970 and 1987. Two sets of questions are the focus. First, what present or past characteristics of a city’s economic environment are critical in determining current employment levels in different industries? How much persistence in employment patterns is there over time and what is the source of that persistence? The second set of questions explores what inferences can be made from the data and results concerning the nature of externalities in urban markets, involving diversity of suppliers to firms, information spillovers concerning current market conditions and information spillovers involving the spread of technology. While the literature assumes employment levels in individual industries in individual cities show strong mean reversion (“convergence”), in fact that is not the case in the 1970-87 time period. The raw data show strong persistence. The major source of that persistence appears to be persistence in local demand conditions (i.e., persistence in regional comparative advantage), as opposed to other measured or unmeasured urban characteristics. Retention of employment is also strongly helped by the historical degree of local specialization in the industry, perhaps indicating a form of dynamic externality. Other historical conditions are not important.For full article, click the following link: http://www.nber.org/papers/w4178.pdf
    24 Feb
    24 Feb
  • Abstract: Bribes by firms in Indonesia arise principally from regulations –licenses and levies –imposed by local government officials. Regulations generate direct revenues (fees) plus indirect revenues in the form of bribes. The expected value of the latter is capitalized into lower salaries needed by localities to compensate public officials. Localities in Indonesia are hampered by insufficient revenues from formal tax and transfer sources to pay competitive salaries plus fund demanded’ levels of public services, because local tax rates are capped by the center and inter-governmental transfers are limited. Thus the direct and indirect revenues from local regulations are critical to local finances. The paper models and estimates the key aspects of corruption — the relationship between bribes, time spent with local officials, and different forms of regulation. It models how inter-jurisdictional competition for firms limits the extent of local regulation and how greater sources of tax or inter-governmental revenues reduce the need for regulation and corruption. The paper estimates a large reduction in regulation in better funded localities. The findings are directly relevant to Indonesia where corruption is high and the country is in the throes of major decentralization and local democratization efforts.For full article, click the following link: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10674.pdf
    24 Feb
    24 Feb
  • Abstract: Indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from firms. Corruption flourished in the Suharto, pre-democracy era. This paper asks whether local democratization that occurred after Suharto reduced corruption and whether specific local politics, over and above the effects of local culture, affect corruption. We have a firm level data set for 2001 that benchmarks bribing activity and harassment at the time when Indonesia decentralized key responsibilities to local democratically elected governments. We have a second data set for 2004 on corruption at the end of the first democratic election cycle. We find that, overall, corruption declines between these time periods. But specific politics matter. Islamic parties in Indonesia are perceived as being anti-corruption. Our data show voting patterns reflect this belief and voters’ perceptions have some degree of accuracy. In the first democratic election, localities that voted in legislatures dominated by secular parties, including Megawati’s party, experienced significant relative increases in corruption, while the reverse was the case for those voting in Islamic parties. But in the second election in 2004, in those localities where corruption had increased under secular party rule, voters “threw the bums out of office” and voted in Islamic parties.For full article, click the following link: http://www.nber.org/papers/w12110.pdf
    24 Feb
    24 Feb
  • Abstract: Using survey data on fishermen and fishing villages in Aceh, Indonesia from 2005 and 2007, this paper examines the effect of the December 2004 tsunami and resulting massive aid effort on local public good provision, in particular on public labor inputs, but also public capital choices. Also analyzed are the roles of and changes in local social and political institutions and participation in political and social activities. Such an examination informs not only our understanding of the impacts of aid on villages, but also our understanding of how villages allocate resources to public goods. For public labor inputs, volunteerism is lower in villages with more aid projects, but that is offset if the dominant donor mitigates agency problems by doing its own implementation. Volunteerism is lower in villages with more ‘democratic’ activity such as elections, although that effect is mitigated in villages with higher levels of social capital pre-tsunami. Evidence suggests volunteerism is lower not because of changes in types of leaders with village elections per se, but rather due to heightened internal divisions associated with elections. Correspondingly for public capital, villages with more democratic activity combined with more aid projects tend to emphasize garnering private aid (e.g., houses) at the expense of public aid (e.g., public buildings).For full article, click the following link: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23877/
    21 Feb
    21 Feb
  • Abstract Using survey data on fishermen and fishing villages in Aceh, Indonesia from 2005 and 2007, this paper examines the effect of the December 2004 tsunami and resulting massive aid effort on local public good provision, in particular on public labor inputs, but also public capital choices. Also analyzed are the roles of and changes in local social and political institutions and participation in political and social activities. Such an examination informs not only our understanding of the impacts of aid on villages, but also our understanding of how villages allocate resources to public goods. For public labor inputs, volunteerism is lower in villages with more aid projects, but that is offset if the dominant donor mitigates agency problems by doing its own implementation. Volunteerism is lower in villages with more ‘democratic’ activity such as elections, although that effect is mitigated in villages with higher levels of social capital pre-tsunami. Evidence suggests volunteerism is lower not because of changes in types of leaders with village elections per se, but rather due to heightened internal divisions associated with elections. Correspondingly for public capital, villages with more democratic activity combined with more aid projects tend to emphasize garnering private aid (e.g., houses) at the expense of public aid (e.g., public buildings).For full article, click the following link: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23877/
    21 Feb
    21 Feb
  • Abstract   Using three waves of survey data from fishing villages in Aceh, Indonesia for 2005-2009, we examine the determinants of local volunteer labor after the tsunami. Pre-existing social capital and the form of aid delivery (but not trauma) strongly affect village volunteerism initially, but these effects weaken with time. What persists is the effect of essentially a new institution, formal village elections. While recent work suggests democratization increases cooperation, the differentially timed introduction of elections negatively affects volunteerism, suggesting a regime switch effect where traditional leaders chosen by elites want more volunteer labor projects than democratically elected leaders do.For full article, click the following link: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2011/2011-8_paper.pdf
    21 Feb
    21 Feb
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